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The relationship between disclosure quality and cost of equity capital is an important topic in 
today's economy. In general, economic theory and anecdotal evidence suggest a negative as-
sociation. Empirical work on this link, however, is confronted with major methodological 
drawbacks - neither disclosure level nor cost of capital can be observed directly - and has 
documented somewhat confounding results so far. Adopting a finite horizon version of the 
residual income model, I provide evidence on the nature of the above relationship and try to 
quantify the effect of a firm's voluntary disclosure policy on its implied cost of capital. Swit-
zerland seems especially suited for an analysis of this kind given that Swiss firms have con-
siderable reporting discretion and the mandated level of disclosure is low. For a cross-
sectional sample of73 non-financial companies I show a negative and highly significant asso-
ciation between the two variables. The magnitude is such that the most forthcoming firms 
enjoy about a 1.8% to 2.4% cost advantage over the least forthcoming firms. The findings 
persist even after controlling for other potentially influential variables, e.g. risk characteristics 
and firm size. Furthermore, adjusting for self-selection bias- a major concern in disclosure 
studies - the marginal effect remains of the same direction and even increases in magnitude 
although at lower levels of statistical significance. One reason for the strong relationship 
might be found in differing institutional factors between the US and Swiss capital markets. 
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1 Introduction 
The relationship between disclosure quality and cost of equity capital is an important topic 
in today 's economy. In general, anecdotal evidence and the widespread perception of its role 
among practitioners suggest that disclosure policy is negatively related to a company's costs 
of equity financing. Theoretical research also supports the impact of greater disclosure to re-
duce cost of capital by emphasizing its effect on stock market liquidity and estimation risk. 
Empirical work on this relationship, however, is confronted with major methodological draw-
backs and has documented somewhat confounding results so far. Neither disclosure level nor 
cost of capital can be observed directly and both variables rely heavily on individual percep-
tion rather than actual use. In addition, as most of the prior studies focus on data from pub-
licly held companies in the US, whose disclosure environment is already rich, it might prove 
difficult to document the conjectured relation empirically. In order to strengthen empirical 
tests, recent studies such as Healy et a!. ( 1999) or Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) concentrate on 
specific occasions and reporting contexts where one can observe large changes in disclosure 
policy, thereby hoping to render the presumably subtle effect of disclosure more easily detect-
able. 
In accordance with this line of research, I therefore turn to a low disclosure environment 
trying to identify the impact of voluntary corporate reporting on a firm ' s implied cost of 
capital. Switzerland seems to be particularly suited for an analysis of this kind: the stock mar-
ket displays many common attributes of a typical stock market in continental Europe and 
management's reliance on shareholder interests is a relatively new phenomenon. Moreover, 
Swiss firms have considerable reporting discretion and the mandated level of disclosure is 
low. The only requirement for stock listed companies is compliance with Swiss GAAP. Al-
though frequently referred to as the local adaptation of internationally accepted accounting 
standards, it leaves the companies with a high degree of freedom in choosing their voluntary 
disclosure policy. For instance, any adoption of materially equal or better accounting stan-
dards (e.g. lAS or US GAAP) meets the listing criteria of the Swiss Exchange, and can be 
interpreted as a firm 's commitment to greater disclosure. In response to their financial needs 
many Swiss firms voluntarily provide supplementary information within the context of Swiss 
GAAP. This specific research setting should make it easier to detect the economic conse-
quences of an increased reporting strategy on a firm's cost of equity capital. 
For a cross-sectional sample of 73 non-financial companies I show a negative and highly 
significant association between the two variables. As the coefficient on my disclosure score -
measured as fractional rank rather than absolute value - indicates the presence of about a 
1.8% to 2.4% cost difference among the most and the least forthcoming firms, the findings are 
not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. The results hold even after 
taking into account various other firm characteristics, e.g. firm size, market beta and financial 
leverage. Adjusting for self-selection bias, the marginal effect of a firm's disclosure policy 
remains of the same direction and even increases in magnitude although at lower levels of 
statistical significance. 
To assess a firm ' s disclosure quality, I focus on the amount of voluntary disclosure pro-
vided in the annual report. The disclosure index used in my study was developed by the Swiss 
4 
Banking Institute at the University of Zurich and reflects three different kinds of voluntary 
reporting choice. To compute prospective cost of capital- the dependent variable- I adopt a 
finite horizon version of the accounting based valuation formula proposed by Gebhardt et a/. 
(2000). Firm value, measured by stock price, is set equal to current book value plus future 
discounted residual income over a short-term period of explicit forecasts , a medium-term 
fading period and a long-term perpetuity. Solving for the implied discount rate gives us an 
estimate of the ex ante cost of equity capital without relying on realized stock return data. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briet1y reviews prior re-
search on the topic. In section 3, I develop the main hypothesis and describe the independent 
and dependent variables. Proxy selection, sampling procedures and descriptive statistics for 
sample firms are provided in section 4. Section 5 assesses the validity of my measures of dis-
closure level and cost of equity capital and reports empirical findings. In section 6 specifica-
tion tests are presented. Conclusions and suggestions for future research appear in section 7. 
2 Related Research 
From a theoretical point of view two distinct lines of research support the hypothesis of a 
negative connection between disclosure level and cost of equity capital: a stock market li-
quidity and an estimation risk perspective. On the one hand, firms try to overcome the reluc-
tance of potential investors for holding shares in illiquid markets by revealing private infor-
mation and thereby reducing their cost of capital. For example, Diamond and Verrecchia 
( 1991) construct a model in which disclosure improves future liquidity of a firm ' s securities 
by attracting increased demand from large investors, and this in turn reduces the firm's costs 
of equity financing, with large firms benefiting the most. 1 This stream of research includes 
Glosten and Milgram ( 1985 ), Amihud and Mendelson ( 1986) or Baiman and Verrecchia 
(1996) and is also supported by a recent experimental study from Bloomfield and Wilks 
(2000), who in a laboratory financial market show that improved disclosure quality leads in-
vestors to demand shares at higher prices (therefore implicitly lowering cost of capital) and to 
provide a greater degree of liquidity. On the other hand, firms try to reduce potential inves-
tors' estimation risk regarding the parameters of a security' s future return or payoff distribu-
tion by providing better disclosure. If at least part of the estimation risk component is non-
diversifiable, e.g. when investors have different information regarding individual securities, 
and low information assets constitute a nontrivial fraction of the final portfolios, then it 
should be priced by the market to some degree. For example, Handa and Linn ( 1993) show in 
their Arbitrage Pricing Theory model, that a Bayesian investor attributes more systematic risk 
to an asset with low information (e.g. poor disclosure) than to an asset with high information 
leading to lower demands and prices than under complete information. This line of research is 
represented by Klein and Bawa (1976), Coles eta/. ( 1995) or Clarkson eta/. (1996). In sum-
They further show that under certain, " less typical" conditions the reduction of information asymmetry can 
also have the opposite effect, implying a less-than-full-disclosure equilibrium. For a general discussion of 
the theoretical underpinnings and assumptions of the relation between disclosure and the cost of capital see 
e.g. Verrecchia ( 1999). 
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mary, positive effects of improved financial reporting are sustained by accounting theory in 
two respects: (l) investors' preferences for securities with potentially small transactions costs 
when executing future trades and (2) investors' preferences for securities with a relatively 
lower level of uncertainty about future returns or payoffs. 2 
Empirical support for the suggested link comes from a growing body of recent studies. In 
most cases the authors try to relate corporate disclosures and the information asymmetry 
component (or some information risk premium) and not the entire cost of capital, as this pro-
cedure offers a more direct test ofthe predicted association. For example, Welker (1995) and 
Sengupta ( 1998) document a significant negative relation between financial analysts' disclo-
sure rankings and a firm's bid-ask spread as well as its interest cost of issuing debt, respec-
tively. Healy eta/. (1999) show that firms with significant and sustained improvements in 
voluntary disclosure experience improved stock performance and capital market intermedia-
tion. For a sample of German firms, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) document that an interna-
tional reporting strategy (lAS or US GAAP) in contrast to local GAAP is associated with 
lower bid-ask spreads and higher share turnover after controlling for various firm characteris-
tics other than disclosure policy. In other kinds of studies, researchers focus on a single type 
of disclosure. Marquardt and Wiedman ( 1998), for example, provide evidence that managers 
- by their discretion to issue earnings forecasts ahead of selling their own stocks through a 
secondary equity offering- act as if increased voluntary disclosure and reduced information 
asymmetry correlate with a reduced cost of capital. Clement et a/. (2000) investigate the 
capital market's reaction to the release of confirming earnings forecasts and find a significant 
positive relationship in combination with a reduction in earnings uncertainty. 
An alternate way of testing the above relation is looking at the entire cost of capital in-
stead of concentrating on the information asymmetry component. Although this approach is 
likely to introduce some noise, it offers the advantage of estimating the magnitude of the dis-
closure effect on a firm ' s discount factor. Probably the first attempt to establish such a direct 
link was made by Botosan (1997) . From a sample of 115 firms from the machinery industry 
she demonstrated that among firms attracting a low analyst following, those with higher-
quality disclosures (as measured by her own disclosure index) benefited from lower costs of 
capital (as measured implicitly by a version of the residual income model). In Botosan and 
Plumlee (2000) the basic research methodology is extended to include a larger, multi-industry 
sample over several consecutive years, three different types of disclosures and four alternate 
estimates of cost of equity capital. The findings - albeit at the 5 to 8% level of statistical sig-
nificance - suggest that greater disclosure provided through a company' s annual report is as-
sociated with a lower cost of capital after controlling for firm size and market beta.3 In the 
The proprietary nature of disclosure often limit<; the amount and quality of information actually disclosed, 
e.g. when facing imperfect product market competition or potential entry. For analytical models explicitly 
incorporating the costs of increased disclosure see e.g. Verrecchia ( 1983), Darrough and Stoughton ( 1990), 
Verrecchia ( 1990), and Wagenhofer ( 1990). 
For the other disclosure categories included in the analysis (e.g. other publications, investor relations and 
total disclosure score) somewhat confounding result<; are reported in that either none or a positive relation is 
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following, I adopt a similar teclmiq ue to Botosan ( 1997) because of its intuitive appeal to 
make the effects of an improved reporting strategy more visible. As her results may suffer 
from self-selection bias, however, potential endogeneity of the disclosure variable has to be 
taken into account. 
For reasons of disclosure regulations I focus on the capital market in Switzerland. Empiri-
cal evidence, however, on the relationship between disclosure practices and capital market 
characteristics in a Swiss environment is scarce. For example, in examining the determinants 
of the voluntary disclosure behavior of Swiss listed firms, Rafiournier ( 1995) shows that large 
and internationally diversified companies tend to provide more information in their annual 
reports than small, purely domestic enterprises. Auer ( 1998) does not find a statistically sig-
nificant impact on the variance of stock returns and market beta when a firm switches from 
lower-quality Swiss GAAP to presumably higher-quality international reporting standards, 
but documents a significant increase in the variance of abnormal returns around earnings re-
lease dates induced by the change. Finally, Caramanolis eta/. (1999) try to relate stock price 
abnormal reactions subsequent to the release of annual reports to financial analysts ' percep-
tion of disclosure quality and the number of analysts following a given firm. They find an 
asymmetric relationship in that positive abnormal returns are positively related to the disclo-
sure rating variable (signaling hypothesis), while negative abnormal returns are inversely af-
fected by analyst coverage (adverse selection hypothesis) but not vice versa. 
3 Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
Hypothesis development 
As outlined above, anecdotal evidence, economic theory and empirical research suggest 
that increasing disclosure levels should reduce the estimation risk and information asymmetry 
components of a firm's cost of capital. Whereas the former works via improving forecast ac-
curacy of a security ' s future return or payoff distribution, the latter works via diminishing 
information disparities among traders thereby augmenting liquidity . This reasoning motivates 
the following hypothesis (stated in alternative form): 
H. : There is a negative association between the quality of corporate disclosures and the 
expected cost of equity capital. 
The major difficulty in documenting this relationship empirically is fourfold: ( 1) the qual-
ity of corporate disclosures can not be assessed objectively and relies heavily on the percep-
tion and not the actual use of disclosure either by the researcher or by some peer user group; 
(2) firms might not choose disclosure level independently, which makes the variable subject 
to self-selection bias; (3) there is no direct measure of the firm's prospective cost of capital 
nor of its components; (4) the relationship between disclosure level and the market's profit-
found. Botosan and P lumlee (2000) argue that more timely disclosures might attract short-term investors 
leading to an increase in stock price volatility and thus, higher instead of lower cost of equity capital. 
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ability expectations might be weak or confounded by several other factors so that no signifi-
cant association is found. The research design attempts to cope with each of these concerns. 
Independent variable: Quality of Corporate Disclosures 
The purpose of my disclosure variable is to produce a reliable cross-sectional ranking of 
disclosure level among different firms. While Swiss accounting law and Swiss GAAP provide 
a minimum standard for Swiss listed companies, considerable latitude remains in what infor-
mation is actually disclosed. Management has the discretion to voluntarily provide more than 
the mandatory requirements, e.g. earnings and sales forecasts, value-based performance 
measures, information on executive compensation schemes or qualitative discussion of the 
firm' s business strategy. This kind of discretionary behavior does not- as often suggested by 
public opinion- necessarily assume that someone is being " fooled". Rather, it can be viewed 
as the management communicating its superior information to outside investors and is there-
fore the natural manifestation of multi-period contracting in an incomplete market (see Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986 ). This reasoning provides several motivations for voluntary disclosure 
such as overcoming the adverse selection problem, reducing transaction costs in capital mar-
kets or avoiding future legal costs from stockholder proxy suits. 
To assess a firm's disclosure quality I focus on the amount of voluntary disclosure pro-
vided in its annual report. The restriction to a single source of corporate information, although 
quite rigid, offers several advantages: annual reports are generally considered the most im-
portant information source for financial analysts and investors in making their investment 
choice. Timing differences are minimized as most companies release their annual reports 
within three months after the end of the fiscal year, usually December 31. Given their for-
malized structure, annual reports are more easily comparable among firms than other, less 
formal communication channels like press releases or direct contact with analysts. Further-
more, empirical research indicates a positive correlation between information dispersed by 
annual reports and other types of communication (Lang and Lundholm, 1993 ), suggesting that 
firms coordinate their overall disclosure policy. However, caution should be used in inter-
preting the results: to the same extent that several means of communication are positively 
correlated, the marginal efiect of voluntary annual report disclosures is likely to be overstated. 
No attempt is made to disentangle these overlapping forces. Rather than the annual report 
alone, the results are likely to reflect the outcome of a whole bundle of voluntary disclosures 
provided by the firm. In addition, the measurement of disclosure level needs some sort of 
benchmark to compare against and the defmition of criteria to assess its informativeness. In 
every case, the selected items imply a certain level of subjectivity that may (or may not) re-
flect the actual use of information by investors. 
As suggested by several recent studies (e.g. Welker, 1995; Harris and Muller, 1999; Leuz 
and V errecchia, 2000) there might exist an endogeneity problem in determining the associa-
tion between cost of capital and disclosure policy. Specifically, if firms purposefully choose 
their reporting strategy considering the costs and benefits of increased disclosures, the analy-
sis of the above relationship might suffer from self-selection bias. For instance, companies 
that opt for a high disclosure environment might differ from those that do not in terms of firm 
characteristics and hence may have lower costs of capital regardless. In the presence of en-
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dogeneity, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is likely to produce inconsistent estima-
tors. Therefore, sensitivity tests are conducted using a two-equation model in which both, cost 
of equity capital as well as disclosure level, appear as endogenously selected: ( 1) in an at-
tempt to represent the firm ' s reporting decision, disclosure quality is modeled as a function of 
several firm characteristics identified in prior research, and (2) cost of capital is modeled as a 
function of- among others - the firm's voluntary disclosure choice thereby ex plicitly taking 
into account the endogenous nature of this variable. The two-equation approach is then esti-
mated utilizing two-stage least squares (2SLS) in order to control for potential self-selection 
bias. 
Dependent variable: Ex ante Cost of Capital 
To compute the ex ante cost of capital I adopt a version of the accounting based valuation 
formula often referred to as the residual income model.4 In this model firm value is repre-
sented as a function of current and forecasted accounting data subject only to the clean sur-
plus relation, that is, all future changes in book value arise either from earnings, capital con-
tributions or dividends. Using the residual income model I then compute the ex ante cost of 
capital as the internal rate of return that equates the intrinsic value of the firm to the current 
stock price. 
The derivation of the residual income model starts with the dividend discount formula, 
which is standard in neoclassical models of security valuation. It states that the implied mar-
ket price of a firm's stock is equal to the present value of future expected dividends: 
where 
r 
EJ] 
( 1) 
" intrinsic" value ofthe firm at date t 
net dividends paid during period (t-1 , t) 
discount rate 
expected value operator condit ioned on information available 
at date t 
This definition assumes a flat term -structure of either the cost of risky equity capital or the 
risk-free discount rates. 5 Under the assumption of clean surplus accounting, that is: 
(2) 
where accounting book value of equity at date t 
The re lation expressed in this mode l, although not new, gained vast attention among researchers and for 
pr-actical use with the theoretical work of Ohlson ( 1995) and Feltham and Ohlson ( 1995). Earlier analytical 
treatment can be found in Preinreich ( 193 8), LUcke ( 1955), Edwards and Bell ( 1961 ), and Peasnell ( 1982). 
Although Ohlson (1 995) and Feltham and Ohlson ( 1995) develop the ir model by d iscounting the risk-
adjusted arguments at the risk-free rate, no additional assumptions are required to restate it in terms of un-
adjusted dividends or earnings, respectively, discounted at the cost of risky equity capital (Bernard, I 995). 
X t accounting earnings for period (t-1, t) 
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I then impose a restriction on the relation between accounting earnings, book value and 
dividends through time. Solving the clean surplus relation in (2) for dividends and combining 
it with the dividend discount formula in (1) yields, after some algebraic manipulation, the 
residual income model: 
v = hv +"' E 1+-< 1 -r- t = hv +" E t+-< 1 -r -t = [x -r · hv ] = [(PROF - r)bv ] 
I t ~ t (1+rf t -tt t (1+rf (3) 
where PROF; = after-tax return on book value of equity for period (t-1, t) 
Firm value equals reported book value plus an infinite sum of discounted residual income 
and is expressed entirely as a function of accounting numbers, namely expected future earn-
ings and current and expected future book values. No explicit reference to dividends is 
needed. It is important to note that, as it stands , equation (3) is just the residual income ver-
sion of the dividend discount model. It holds regardless of the accounting method used, even 
if the reported numbers are manipulated. 
In an efficient market the intrinsic value Vat date t equals the market price P of a firm's 
stock at date t. Using this relationship and solving, by an iterative process, for the implied 
discount rate produces an estimate of the ex ante cost of capital conditioned on the c urrently 
available information. I now turn to the empirical implementation of the model outlined 
above. 
Empirical Implementation 
To measure the firm's intrinsic value, equation (3) requires forecasting future earnings 
and book values to infinity. Practical valuation analysis, however, calls for accounting num-
bers to be forecasted over finite horizons. This truncation necessarily involves terminal value 
calculations based on assumptions about the time-series properties of future residual income. 
Similar to Lee et a /. (1999) and Gebhardt eta/. (2000) I adopt a three-stage approach to com-
pute intrinsic value: first, I use explicit earnings forecasts for the next three years ; second, I 
derive earnings forecasts by linearly fading year t+ 3 after-tax return on book value of equity 
to the median market return on equity by year t+T, and third, I calculate terminal value by 
assuming the latest residual income as a perpetuity. This leads to the following finite horizon 
specification: 
where 
r 
e 
(4) 
market price of a firm's stock at date t 
expected future accounting earnings for period (t+'t-1 , t+'t), 
either ex plicitly forecasted, generated by a linear fading rate 
or assumed constant 
estimate of the ex ante cost of capital calculated as the inter-
nal rate of return to solve the equation 
lO 
expected future accounting book value of equity at date t+'t, 
where hv/+1: = hv/+1:- l + x/+1: - d/+1: and d/+1: = expected future 
net dividends for period (t+<t-1, t+<t), derived from the divi-
dend payout ratio k times the earnings forecast X1H 
Current stock price is set equal to current book value plus discounted residual income over 
a short-term period of explicit forecasts, a medium-term fading period and long-term perpetu-
ity with no further growth. This disaggregation along the timeline attempts to capture our su-
perior knowledge about the near-term future as well as the effect of dissipating economic 
rents within a forecast horizon of reasonable length (see Bernard, 1994 ). 
Despite its intuitive appeal, the suggested empirical model is far from indisputable. In or-
der to calculate future residual income, estimates of future book values and, consequently, of 
future dividends are required. This leaves us in much the same position as with the dividend 
discount model. It can be shown that the above finite horizon valuation model is just a special 
case of forecasting dividends up to period t+T in combination with an appropriate terminal 
value calculation (Penman, 1997; Dechow eta/. , 1999). Thus, intrinsic value can be rewritten 
as explicit forecasts of dividends for the near-term and medium-term future and dividends are 
assumed to equal accounting earnings thereafter. No further reference to c urrent book value of 
equity is needed. A second concern relates to the linear information dynamics in either 
Ohlson ( 1995) or Feltham and Ohlson ( 1995) that deals with the time-series behavior of ab-
normal earnings. No such restriction on the relation between current information and future 
residual income is considered (see Myers, 1999). 
The implementation ofthe residual income model in (3) as a stepwise function in (4) puts 
the emphasis on the explicit forecast period. Because 
Ji;r -7 J; as T -7 oo 
where 
(5) 
intrinsic value of the firm at date t as a function of f uture 
earnings and book values measured over a finite horizon 
the proxy of intrinsic value approaches the c urrent market price of the firm's stock, so long as 
the forecast horizon is just "long enough" (Bernard, 1995). Thus, the usefulness of the se-
lected research procedure ultimately rests on an empirical question. As Penman and Sougian-
nis ( 1998) show, valuation errors are lower using accrual earnings techniques rather than cash 
flow or dividend discounting techniques over forecasting horizons as reasonable within one to 
eight years. 6 In the remainder I relate the empirical estimate of the ex ante cost of capital to 
my measure of disclosure quality and assess its validity in various specification tests. 
Contrary to Penman and Sougiannis ( 1998), I empirically adopt the res idual income model ba sed on actual 
forecasts, not on ex post realizations. 
ll 
4 Input Data, Sample Selection and Description 
Proxies for Disclosure Quality 
The disclosure score DISC relies on a study conducted by the Swiss Banking Institute 
(SBI) at the University of Zurich and published in "Bilanz" , a Swiss economic and business 
monthly. The index is based on the voluntary information companies provide with respect to 
Swiss GAAP in their 1997 annual report to shareholders, which leaves the management with 
enough discretion in determining a firm's reporting strategy. Ideally, one would identify the 
difference between all information items disclosed in annual reports and those whose disclo-
sure is mandatory. Since this procedure seems unrealistic, SBI chose to question primary us-
ers of financial statements on voluntary disclosure items they considered informative in their 
decision making process. However, any list of items is subject to selection bias and can be 
criticized. Testing the validity of disclosure scores hence becomes critical. 
Disclosure quality is assessed using a value reporting scorecard and assigning points to 
predefined criteria. The selection of items included in the scorecard was guided by financial 
analysts ' and investors' informational needs identified in prior research (e.g. Botosan, 1997), 
in anecdotal evidence, in a survey among Swiss institutional investors and financial analysts, 
and in interviews with a peer user group. Three categories of voluntary disclosure are recog-
nized: (1) background and non-financial information, such as principal products and markets 
and organizational structure or operational efficiency, to provide insights into a firm's com-
petitive environment and into its performance where not properly reflected in current financial 
statements; (2) trend analysis and management discussion and analysis, such as sales trends 
over the last several years and qualitative discussion of last year's change, to allow investors 
to evaluate a company's financial history; (3) risk , value-based and projected information, 
such as risk ex posure, management compensation or earnings forecasts, to assess manage-
ment's contribution to create shareholder value and to enlighten the firm's future prospects. 
Appendix A summarizes the major elements included in the disclosure index. Each item 
scores two points if there is a detailed description including e.g. quantified information or 
qualitative discussion, one point if it is mentioned in annual reports but only generally and 
zero otherwise. No weighting is used so that the overall score represents a simple summation 
of its components suggesting that every item analyzed is equally important. If a company re-
ports all the requested data, a total of 54 points is assigned. I perform my analysis using the 
fractional rank of a firm's disclosure score as it is less sensitive to the influence of outliers 
and makes the regression coefficients easier to interpret. Using absolute disclosure values 
instead does not qualitatively change the results. DRANK is computed by dividing the rank of 
DISC by the number of firms in the sample and increases with disclosure quality. 
Proxies for Ex ante Cost of Capital 
To implement the ±mite horizon specification of the residual income model, stock prices 
and several proxies of current and future accounting numbers are needed. Specifically, I 
choose June 30, 1998, as the observation date to ensure that the analysis is based solely on 
publicly available information. By that point all the companies in the sample had released 
their annual reports for fiscal year 1997 so that disclosure quality should be reflected by the 
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market. As the current market price is set equal to the intrinsic value, care should be used in 
selecting an adequate price for a firm ' s stock. Instead of arbitrarily choosing the closing price 
of a single day I use the equally weighted average for the month of June as market proxy .7 
This procedure accounts for the sequential release of annual reports and corresponds to the 
analysts' forecast data, which also represent the entire month of June rather than a specific 
date. The following valuation formula is estimated for each firm: 
where 
r 
e 
(6) 
equally weighted stock price for the month of June 
accounting book value per share at the beginning of the fiscal 
year 
I use analysts ' consensus forecasts and the mean long-term 
earnings growth rate as of June to calculate one-, two- and 
three-year-ahead earnings per share; beyond year t+3, earn-
ings are forecasted by linearly fading actual return on book 
value of equity to the median market return on equity by year 
t+l2 
internal rate of return 
ex pected future accounting book value derived from clean 
surplus; future net dividends are estimated using the firm's 
average dividend payout ratio over the last five years 
Analysts ' most recent consensus forecasts serve as best proxies of accounting earnings for 
the first two fiscal years.8 For fiscal 2000 future expected earnings are derived by multiplying 
one plus the estimated long-term earnings growth rate with two-year-ahead earnings forecasts. 
Where no or only a single estimate is available the expected median sample growth rate is 
used instead. To compute book values, quite rigid assumptions are placed on the estimate of 
future dividend payout. For lack of better data, net dividends are estimated as a constant ratio 
of expected future earnings up to the finite forecast horizon and - assuming no more growth 
in later periods as is common in residual value calculation- set equal to t+T earnings there-
after. The dividend payout ratio is defined as a historical mean adjusted for unusual observa-
tions (e.g. observations outside the range of 0 and 1). The explicit forecast horizon is fixed 
and consists of 12 future periods, which may be too short for growth firms and too long for 
mature firms.9 Target accounting return on equity of 8.98% is calculated as the median of past 
I also estimate the cost of capital proxy us ing the closing price of June 30, 1998, instead of the monthly 
average. The test results are insensitive to alternative price specification. 
There exists a broad range of studies that show analysts' superiority relative to univariate time-series models 
in predicting future earnings (e.g. Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Fried and Givoly, 1982: O'Brien, 1988) so that 
their estimates proxy for future expected earnings in my valuation model. 
I also compute the implied cost of capital using T = 9 or 15 without materially changing the main results. 
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returns from all Swiss listed companies over the last five years. I do not, however, adjust for 
industry specific returns as the Swiss market is generally too small and industry classification 
becomes rather arbitrary. 10 
Appendix B shows a more detailed illustration of the valuation model. Equity prices and 
accounting numbers are provided by Datastream (except for 8 firms where accounting data is 
handcollected based on Datastream definitions), earnings forecasts and analyst data are col-
lected from the IIB/E/S International database." 
Sample Selection 
In their 1997 study of disclosure quality, SBI limited their analysis to the 50 highest capi-
talized Swiss companies plus another 61 randomly chosen smaller companies including some 
non-listed firms. This sampling procedure suggests a positive bias in disclosure quality since 
disclosure levels exhibit a positive correlation with market value (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). 
Disclosure costs tend to decrease with firm size and the information environment is generally 
assumed to be richer for large firms in terms of analyst and media coverage. As long as a suf-
ficient cross-sectional variation in the disclosure score remains, the empirical analysis should 
not suffer from this deficit. Out of the 111 firms with disclosure score DISC available, 16 are 
dropped because of lack of stock and forecast data. Another 4 data sets are excluded by lim-
iting the sample to firms whose fiscal year ends on December 31 (the majority) or during the 
first three months of the year. This criterion ensures that annual reports are publicly available 
by the end of June and stock prices have already incorporated the new information. Contrary 
to Botosan ( 1997), my sample is not restricted to companies from a single industry although I 
exclude 18 firms from the banking and insurance sector. Disclosure practices of financial in-
stitutions are strongly influenced by regulatory requirements and their business (and espe-
cially their business' recognition in financial statements) differs heavily from other industries. 
This suggests a systematic bias in disclosure quality, e.g. for risk information, and financial 
leverage (my proxy for financial risk as outlined below). 12 As shown in table 1, the sample 
selection procedure yields a final sample of 73 non-financial companies listed on the Swiss 
Exchange SWX. 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the sample are provided in table 2. The various measures associ-
ated with size- market value of outstanding equity (MARKET), book value of total assets 
10 
II 
12 
In additional analyses not reported the sample is split into industrial firms (n = 52) and serv ice firms (n = 
21) us ing each subgroup's median of past accounting returns on equity as target ratio to calculate the im-
plied cost of capital for the corresponding companies in the entire sample. This alternate specification does 
not affect the results. 
To ensure consistency and to check my understanding of Datastream definitions, I compared handcollected 
data with original data prov ided by Datastream for several firms. 
Including banking and insurance companies in the sample does not change the major empirical findings 
although the results are generally weaker and specification te!>ts are more dependent on a single set of ob-
servations. 
14 
(ASSET), total sales (SALES) and the number of employees (NEMP) - indicate a substantial 
cross-sectional variation in firm size. Market value of equity ranges from 27 CHF million for 
the smallest to 151.8 CHF billion for the largest firm in the sample. Mean (median) value is 
6.3 CHF billion ( 661 CHF million). Including companies from the banking and insurance 
industry would intensify the disparity among firms even more. Leaving the median value 
quasi-unchanged, the sample mean would increase to 7. 7 CHF billion. 
Risk, another important firm characteristic, is measured in two different ways. First, mar-
ket beta ofthe stock (BETA) is estimated based on a two-year market model regression on the 
Swiss Performance Index SPI requiring at least 24 weekly return observations. Mean (me-
dian) value of0.63 (0.61) is notably below the theoretical value of one, indicating a system-
atic bias in the beta estimates. Only 11 out of 73 values surpass the presumed risk measure of 
the market as a whole. The results could be driven by several factors: every empirical test 
involving beta is also a test of its theoretical underpinnings. If the basic assumptions of the 
capital asset pricing model CAPM do not hold for the Swiss market because of market size or 
market structure, the resulting beta will be biased. Small firms, for instance, suffer from non-
trading effects that underestimate beta values. Furthermore, beta coefficients based on histori-
cal data might be a poor proxy for future expected values. Schultz and Zimmermann (1989) 
show high inter-temporal variation in beta estimates for Swiss stocks, suggesting adjustments 
to account for beta's mean-reverting property. However, for the results reported below the 
unadjusted version of market beta is used, as is common practice in accounting literature. 13 
This procedure takes into account that - by looking at relative values - bias in beta estimates 
is not, by itself: a problem as long as the bias is consistent across all firms. Second, financial 
leverage (LEV) defined as the ratio of total debt to market value of outstanding equity is used 
as proxy for a firm' s riskiness (see Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The higher a company's 
relative debt position, the more likely it will face financial distress from defaulting on interest 
and principal payments. Although the median value of0.35 is considerably low, 12 observa-
tions exhibit financial leverage of one or more. 
To assess a firm's disclosure environment, I apply two variables: the number of analysts 
following a specific firm (ANALYST) and my measure of disclosure quality (DISC). The 
average sample firm is followed by approximately 11 analysts. One quarter of the firms at-
tract the attention of 7 or fewer analysts compared with the firms in the upper quartile which 
are followed by 15 or more persons. Three companies - Ciba Specialty Chemicals, Roche and 
Sika, all from the chemicals and pharmaceutical industry - receive the highest disclosure 
score of 30 points. They provide essential information on company background, key non-
financials, value-based metrics and trend data, respectively, but still leave enough room for 
further improvement (fulfillment rate: 56% of overall score). On the other hand, Affichage 
Holding, an advertising and placard company, achieves a total of 7 points. Minimal back-
ground, non-financial and trend information is given in combination with a poor discussion of 
lJ For a subsample of 46 observations I also conduct the analysis using Blume ( 1975) estimates of beta coeffi-
cients which correct for estimation error and long-term trends in betas towards one. As expected, the mean 
and median values are significantly higher than without correction (e.g. 0.84 and 0.85, respectively). The re-
sults of the subsequent analysis, however, seem not to be affected by the choice of unadjusted betas. 
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changes in sales and operating income. The standard deviation of 5.6 points indicates a sub-
stantial amount of variation in the underlying annual reports. 
Finally, ROE marks my estimate of future expected cost of equity capital as described 
above. The mean (median) value is 6.18% (6.06%) and the inter-quartile range of approxi-
mately 2% indicates a relatively tight distribution. Although 6.18% may appear low at first 
sight, it could be reasonable. With an actual (risk-tree) yield on the 10-year federal govern-
ment bond on June 30, 1998, of 3.08%, an average historical risk premium for the Swiss mar-
ket of approximately 5% (e.g. Auer, 1998), and the sample average beta of 0.63 the CAPM 
generates a crude ex ante cost of capital estimate of 6.23%. Moreover, current research by 
Claus and Thomas ( 1999) and Gebhardt eta/. (2000) suggests that the implied risk premium 
for the market might be significantly lower than the traditional estimate obtained from ex post 
realized returns . In any event, the objective of m y study is not to explain the absolute level of 
ex ante cost of equity capital, but to demonstrate cross-sectional variation in a firm' s cost of 
capital conditional on differing disclosure quality. 
5 Empirical Results 
Validity of Disclosure Score 
Corporate financial reporting is not easily evaluated because the development and appli-
cation of a disclosure score relies heavily on a person's subjective perception and not on the 
actual use of disclosure. I therefore assess the validity of my disclosure measure DISC in two 
different ways: (1 ) since reporting strategies are coordinated across various avenues, the com-
ponents of a disclosure index should exhibit a positive relationship with one another, and (2) 
disclosure scores should be associated with other firm characteristics identified in prior re-
search that proxy for disclosure level. I use the results of a Pearson correlation analysis pre-
sented in table 3 to address these issues. 
First, I assess the relationship between the overall company disclosure score DISC and its 
three components (DISC_ l , DISC_2 and DISC_3). Each correlation coefficient is positive 
and, with one exception, highly significant. The coefficients among the components them-
selves are considerably lower than the ones involving DISC. I therefore suggest that the three 
categories may capture different aspects of disclosure. Nonetheless, they are still well repre-
sented by the firm' s grand total. 
Second, I examine several other variables where a relationship with disclosure level has 
already been shown empirically (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Raffournier, 1995; Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999): the number of analysts following a specific firm (ANALYST), market 
value of outstanding equity (MARKET), current profitability level measured as average real-
ized accounting return on equity over the preceding five years (RETURN), listing status cap-
tured by a categorical variable set equal to one if the firm's shares are multiple listed and zero 
otherwise (LIST), financial leverage (LEV), and a udit tirm size, another categorical variable 
set equal to one ifthe firm is a udited by a "Big Six" company and zero otherwise (AUDIT). 
In general, these firm characteristics have been hypothesized to be positively related to disclo-
sure level, with corporate size and stock listing status yielding the most conclusive results. 
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Explanations for this behavior include agency and political costs, corporate governance, sig-
naling, audit firm reputation or capital needs. Consistent with prior research ANALYST, 
MARKET, LIST and AUDIT exhibit a positive and highly significant correlation with disclo-
sure quality. Information should be more easily available for large firms and stocks with 
greater analyst coverage, companies listed internationally provide better disclosures than their 
Swiss-listed only counterparts, and large, well-known auditing firms play an important role in 
improving their clients' reporting strategy. The same holds true for the RETURN variable, 
albeit at a 10% level of statistical significance (two-tail test). Only LEV, my proxy for finan-
cialleverage, does not show a significant association. It seems that highly leveraged Swiss 
firms do not seek to reduce their monitoring costs by disclosing more information, at least in 
an univariate setting. 14 Taken together, the validity of DISC as a measure of voluntary disclo-
sure is generally supported by the above analyses. The same firm characteristics - apart from 
analyst following- are used later to form a disclosure model in the 2SLS approach attempting 
to incorporate self-selection. 
Validity of Ex ante Cost of Capital 
A valid measure of ex ante cost of equity capital should increase with risk and also display 
the well known "size effect". Risk is captured by a firm's market beta and market leverage, 
size by its market capitalization. Table 4 shows the results of an OLS regression analysis of 
my cost of capital estimate ROE on BETA, LEV and the natural log of MARKET. To mini-
mize the influence of outliers, data for financial leverage is winsorized at the upper and lower 
5% of observations and log transformations are used for market value. 
The capital asset pricing model CAPM suggests a stock' s market beta should be positively 
correlated with its cost of capital. Except for the simple regression in panel A, which has no 
explanative power at all, the results are consistent with this conjecture. Especially when in-
cluding BETA and MARKET jointly the coefficient on a firm's systematic risk metric is 
positive and significant, whereas in the complete model the significance level increases to 
12%. This positive but rather weak relation could be caused by several reasons: from a theo-
retical point of view, the inclusion of both BET A and LEV is somewhat inconsistent. Market 
beta is supposed to be a function of the firm's financial leverage and hence should account for 
differences in financial risk. Theory would therefore suggest using unlevered betas in combi-
nation with financial leverage. For ease of comparison and as both variables are subject to 
separate estimation errors, my analysis relies on unadjusted betas.15 Dividing the sample by 
market value into two groups yields further insights. Whereas the large companies' subgroup 
exhibits the same pattern as the sample as a whole, the coefficient on BET A in the small 
companies' subgroup- although positive- is not statistically reliable. This might be due to 
deficiencies in the beta measure itself (e.g. non-trading bias) or the structure of the capital 
market in Switzerland (e.g. extreme concentration). Additional concerns could stem from the 
l4 
l5 
For similar result.:; for the Swiss market even in terms of magnitude see Raffournier ( 1995), who addi-
tionally included ownership structure, internationality and induf.try type in his analys is. 
However, to check for consistency, I also estimate the complete model using unlevered betas. This adjust-
ment does not materially affect the result<;. 
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measurement process of the cost of capital proxy. Using alternate estimation methods Botosan 
( 1997) and Botosan and Plumlee (2000) each document a significant association between beta 
and cost of capital in the predicted direction. To the contrary, Gebhardt et a/. (2000), on 
whose estimation technique I rely, were not able to find a positive relationship between the 
two variables in question. Finally, the theoretical framework of the CAPM indicates that mar-
ket beta might be poorly suited for testing the influence of disclosure quality on cost of capi-
tal. The CAPM provides no role for risk factors other than market beta, e.g. estimation risk, to 
cause variation in cost of capital unless one assumes these factors are directly linked to mar-
ket beta itself. Nevertheless, it should be noted that beyond the univariate analysis, market 
beta shows the expected behavior, especially when considering the results presented below 
(including a firm 's reporting strategy). 
The other two variables, market leverage and size, behave as predicted and the coeffi-
cients on LEV and MARKET are highly significant. ROE can be shown to be an increasing 
function of the amount of debt in a firm's capital structure and a decreasing function of its 
market value. Overall, the results support the validity of my measure of ex ante cost of capi-
tal. As can be seen from panel B, however, the maximum adjusted R2 of 27.3% leaves sub-
stantial variation in ROE unexplained. I now turn to disclosure quality as another possibly 
omitted explanatory variable. 
Empirical Analysis of the Main Hypothesis 
Table 5 provides Pearson correlation coefficients between cost of equity capital and vari-
ous firm characteristics including DRANK, the fl:actional rank of disclosure score. Except for 
BET A every coefficient has the expected sign and is highly significant. The correlation be-
tween ROE and DRANK is -0.4 78 and relevant at virtually all levels of statistical significance 
using a two-tail test. This result is consistent with my claim that the ex ante cost of equity 
capital decreases in disclosure quality, at least in an univariate setting. In the meantime ROE 
also exhibits a negative correlation with BETA (albeit not significant), MARKET and ANA-
LYST as well as a positive correlation with LEV. The significant and positive correlation 
coefficient of 0.558 between market size and market beta supports my conjecture that there 
might exist a non-trading bias for small companies. To prevent multi-collinearity (correlation 
of 0.796 between analyst following and firm size) the MARKET and ANALYST variables 
are not included simultaneously in the multivariate analyses. 
The main hypothesis is tested by regressing cost of equity capital on risk, disclosure level 
and size. This leads to the following regression model: 
(7a) 
or more specifically: 
(7b) 
BETA and LEV are included in the analysis to account for a company's systematic and 
financial risk. MA RKET is included to account for the richness of a firm's information envi-
ronment as well as the significant association between cost of capital and market value pre-
sented earlier. The results obtained from estimating regression equation (7) using simple OLS 
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are provided in table 6 panels A and B. Testing for the presence of heteroscedasticity does not 
indicate any problems (White, 1980), and, using Cook's distance, no influential data points 
have been detected. 
All the coefficients behave as predicted and - with one exception - are significant at the 
6% level or better. BETA and LEV show the expected positive relationship with ROE sug-
gesting that cost of capital is related to systematic and financial risk in the Swiss market. In-
troducing unlevered betas into the complete model even improves the statistical power of the 
relationship (e.g. p-value for BETA 0.045), but does not affect the overall conclusions. 
MARKET is negatively related to cost of capital although not always significant suggesting 
that firm size might also serve as a proxy for several other, not closely defined influences. 
Finally, the fractional rank of disclosure quality as measured by DRANK (rank divided by 
number of firms) exhibits a negative association with ROE. The coefficients are highly sig-
nificant regardless of the regression model specification. The results imply that cost of equity 
capital decreases with disclosure level even after controlling for cross-sectional variation in 
market beta, financial leverage and firm size. The magnitude of the coefficients on DRANK 
ranges from -0.0182 including BETA and MARKET to -0.0244 in the simple regression pre-
sented in panel A. This suggests that the companies in the sample with the most forthcoming 
corporate financial reporting (e.g. fractional rank equals one) enjoy somewhere between a 
1.8% and 2 .4% reduction in their cost of equity capital compared to the least forthcoming 
firms (e.g. fractional rank equals nearly zero). Alternatively stated, estimating the model with 
the absolute disclosure score instead of the fractional rank indicates that a one-unit increase in 
DISC is related to a reduction in cost of equity capital of about 0.1 %, holding all else equal. 
For example, Ciba SC, a Swiss chemical producer, could have possibly gained a 1% equity 
cost advantage over Rieter Holding, an engineering and machinery supplier, by providing 
more background, non-financial and value-based information, which constitutes a ten-point 
difference in respective disclosure scores. The results on disclosure quality though are not 
only statistically significant but also economically relevant. 
However, the findings should be interpreted with caution. The standard error associated 
with the slope coefficients on DRANK is about 0.58%, indicating that the "true" coefficient 
may fall somewhere in between 0.7 and 3.2% (95% confidence interval depending on the 
model specification). Furthermore, including disclosure level in the model increases the ad-
justed R2 to a maximum value of 38.1 %, but still leaves a substantial portion of ROE to be 
ex plained otherwise. And finally, if self-selection of disclosure policy is an issue, simple OLS 
will overestimate the effect ofreporting quality on a firm 's cost of equity capital. 
6 Specification Tests 
To assess the sensitivity of the above results I estimate several variations of the regression 
model: (1) since the forecast horizon is fixed and might be either too short or too long de-
pending on a firm 's position in its life cycle, I use different time horizons (T = 9 or 15) in 
estimating cost of equity capital; (2) I replace the fractional rank of the disclosure score by the 
absolute disclosure value; (3) market value of outstanding equity, my proxy for size, is sub-
stituted by the number of analysts following a specific firm; ( 4) in accordance with Lang and 
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Lundholm ( 1993) I also estimate rank regressions to abstract from the precise functional form 
of the relation between ROE and the independent variables. None of the conclusions drawn 
from the previously reported results are changed. Specifically, the coefficients on DRANK 
(DISC) remain negative at the 1% level of statistical significance or better (one-tail test). In 
some cases, however, the coefficient on MARKET loses its predictive power, especially when 
the explicit forecast period is expanded as far as 15 years or when rank-transformed data is 
used. 
Following Botosan ( 1997) I also test for differences in cost of equity capital contingent on 
a firm's analyst following adopting the model specification given below: 
ROE; = a 0 + a 1DU; + /31BETA; + {32LEv; + {33DRANK; + {34 DRANK; * DU; 
+f351n(MARKEJ;) + E; (8) 
DU is a categorical variable set equal to one if the number of analysts is less than or equal 
to the median and zero otherwise. I let the dummy enter the model on its own and in interac-
tion with DRANK, which allows the slope coefficient associated with disclosure quality and 
the intercept to vary for low versus high analyst attention. As the coefficient on the interaction 
term DRANK*DU is negative ( -0.0020) but far from statistically significant and all the other 
variables behave as predicted (e.g. coefficient on DRANK -0.0195 with a p-value of0.017), I 
do not find any evidence of a differing association between cost of equity capital and disclo-
sure quality for narrowly followed firms. 16 
As argued above, the OLS estimate of the disclosure level coetlicient might suffer from 
self-selection bias. Accordingly, a system of two equations in which both cost of equity capi-
tal and disclosure level appear as endogenous is estimated utilizing 2SLS. In the presence of 
endogeneity this procedure will yield estimators that are consistent and efficient. In the first 
equation, a firm's reporting decision is analyzed using the following disclosure model: 
Disclosure quality; = co+ ()1Size; + ()2Profitahility level; + ()3Stock listing status; 
+<>4Financ ialleverage; + ()5Audit .firm size;+ Y; (9a) 
or more specifically: 
where all the variables are as previously described. The explanative power of the regression 
(not reported) amounts to 34.2% (adjusted R2) and, consistent with prior literature, all the co-
eff'icients are positive and significant at the 8% level or better. 
Table 6 panel C presents results from estimating equation (7)- the cost of capital model-
taking into account that disclosure level is now represented by a linear combination of the 
l6 In another analys is not reported the sample is subdivided according to analyst following (number of analysts 
S:: median versus number of analysts > median), accounting standard (IAS/US GAAP adopters versus non-
adopters), and membership of the Swiss Market Index SMI (member firms versus non-members). The SMI 
consists of the 20 to 25 largest Swiss companies according to their market capitalization. Subsequently, 
separate regressions are estimated for each subsample. The coefficient on DRANK is always negative and 
with the exception ofnon-IAS/US GAAP-adopters (n = 23) and SMI firms (n = 14) highly significant. 
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predetermined variables in the system. The original DRANK variable is thus replaced by the 
fitted values from the first-stage regression. The fitted values serve as proxy for disclosure 
quality but at the same time exhibit less correlation with the disturbance term. By this substi-
tution 2SLS should produce an unbiased estimate of the relation between a firm' s voluntary 
reporting choice and its cost of capital. While BETA and LEV significantly confirm the ex-
pected positive association with ROE, the results on DRANK and MARKET are mixed. 
Whereas the size variable -except for one case -loses its statistical power, disclosure quality 
behaves as predicted. In two out of three cases the coefficients are reliable at conventional 
levels of statistical significance. The results are even more convincing when using unadjusted 
p-values for DRANK (e.g. 0.259, 0.044 and 0.033, respectively) instead of p-values that are 
based on White's corrected standard errors to prevent heteroscedasticity. Moreover, as the 
significant coefficients become more negative when using 2SLS, the OLS approach actually 
understates, not overestimates the marginal effect of disclosure quality. The findings, how-
ever, are subject to several methodological concerns: as the R2 values in the first-stage regres-
sions - although comparable to other studies in the literature - are rather low for predictive 
purposes, the original explanatory variable is not well represented by the instruments. Fur-
thermore, the results obtained by applying 2SLS to small samples and the inferences drawn 
from them should be interpreted with caution, as this statistical technique is of the large-
sample type. Nonetheless, the attempt to explicitly address self-selection bias generally sup-
ports the main hypothesis outlined above. 
7 Summary and Conclusions 
The relationship between disclosure quality and cost of equity capital is an important topic 
in theory and practice and generally, a negative association is assumed. Theoretical research 
supports this claim by emphasizing the effect of greater disclosure on stock market liquidity 
and estimation risk. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence indicates that companies continu-
ously try to reduce their equity financing costs, thereby increasing shareholder value through 
enhanced corporate financial reporting. However, empirical evidence on this relation is rather 
weak for two main reasons: (I) disclosure quality as well as cost of equity capital is subjective 
in nature and very difficult to assess, and (2) most prior studies focus on publicly held com-
panies in the US that operate in an already rich disclosure environment, making it hard to 
document the conjectured relation empirically. 
In this paper I provide further evidence on the nature of the above relationship and try to 
quantify the effect of a firm's voluntary disclosure policy on its cost of capital in a Swiss en-
vironment. Switzerland seems especially suited for an analysis of this kind given that Swiss 
firms have considerable reporting discretion and the mandated level of disclosure is low. For 
a cross-sectional sample of 73 non-financial companies I show a negative and highly signifi-
cant association between ROE, my measure of cost of equity capital, and DRANK, the frac-
tional rank of my disclosure score. The magnitude is such that the most forthcoming firms 
enjoy about a 1.8% to 2.4% cost advantage over the least forthcoming firms. The conclusions 
hold even after taking into account systematic risk, financial risk and firm size. Controlling 
for self-selection - a major concern in disclosure studies - the results are generally (but not 
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exclusively) consistent with the main hypothesis although at lower levels of statistical signifi-
cance. One reason for the strong relationship might be found in differing institutional factors 
between US and Swiss capital markets. In line with Botosan ( 1997) or Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000), the findings support the view that the economic consequences of an increased report-
ing strategy should be easier to detect when the disclosure environment is low. 
The conclusions, however, should be interpreted with due caution: as the study is limited 
to a relatively small sample in a single market during a one-year period, it may prove difficult 
to generalize the results to other markets and time horizons. To further diminish potential 
distortions from endogeneity, future work should concentrate on a better understanding of a 
firm's voluntary reporting behavior. Useful insights can also be expected ±rom studying the 
change in disclosure level over time and its implications for a firm ' s risk position. Finally, 
±rom a more international perspective, similar techniques could be adopted to address differ-
ences in disclosure quality in response to di±Ierent legislation and in different countries 
thereby investigating institutional factors intluencing a particular corporate reporting envi-
ronment. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Sample Selection Process 
Firms with disclosure score DISC available 
Firms not publicly traded on the Swiss Exchange SWX 
Firms not followed by IIB/E/S International (no financial 
analysts' forecast data available) 
Firms with fiscal year end not on December 31, 1997, or 
not within the first quarter of 1998 
Firms available for analysis 
Financial institutions (banking and insurance companies) 
Total number of sample firms 
Number 
111 
-8 
-8 
-4 -20 
91 
-18 
73 
Percent 
100% 
-1 8% 
82% 
-16% 
66% 
Notes: DISC is the overall company disc losure score for fiscal 1997 provided by the Swis..<> Banking Institute 
at the University of Zur ich. 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms 
Percentile Standard 
Variable n Mean Min. Ql Q2 Q3 Max. Deviation 
Size: 
MARKET 73 6'292 27 225 661 2'067 151'806 23'198 
ASSET 73 4'641 55 379 1'221 2'645 54'776 10'934 
SALES 7 1 4'167 84 450 1'073 3'271 69'998 9'557 
NEMP 69 16' 159 247 1'423 4'120 12'437 225'808 38'443 
Risk: 
BETA 73 0.63 -0.15 0.42 0.61 0.86 1.37 0.33 
LEV 73 0.84 0.00 0. 11 0.35 0.76 11.99 1.77 
Disclosure: 
ANALYST 73 11.2 7 11 15 26 6.2 
DISC 73 18.3 7 14 18 22 30 5.6 
Ex ante cost of capital: 
ROE 73 6.18% 2.82% 5.04% 6.06% 7.03% 10.29% 1.49% 
Notes: MARKET is the market value of outstanding equity at the beginning of 1998 in CHF millions. ASSET is 
the book value oftotal assets, SALES is total sales, both for fiscal 1997 in CHF millions. NEMP is the number of 
employees reported for fiscal 1997. BETA is estimated via a market model regression requiring at least 24 weekly 
return observations in the two-year period ended June 30, 1998. LEV is the ratio of total debt to market value of 
out'\tanding equity at the beginning of 1998. ANALYST is the number of analysts following a specific firm as of 
June 1998, reported by UB/E/S International. DISC is the overall company disclosure score for fiscal 1997 
provided by the Swiss Banking Institute at the University of Zurich. ROE is my estimate of future expected cost 
of equity capital derived as the internal rate of return from a twelve-year version of the residual income model as 
described in the text. The sample consif.t'i of 73 non-financ ial companies listed on the Swiss Exchange SWX, 
where the necessary forecast and disclosure data is available. 
Variable 
DISC 1 
DISC 2 
DISC 3 
ANALYST 
MARKET 
RETURN 
LIST 
LEV 
AUDIT 
DISC 
0.719 
(0.000) 
0.826 
(0.000) 
0.625 
(0.000) 
0.563 
(0.000) 
0.557 
(0.000) 
0.206 
(0.081) 
0.431 
(0.000) 
0.053 
(0.658) 
0.273 
(0.019) 
TABLE3 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Disclosure Scores and Firm Characteristics 
DISC 1 
0.316 
(0.006) 
0.223 
(0.058) 
0.265 
(0.023) 
0.199 
(0.091) 
0.129 
(0.276) 
0.305 
(0.009) 
0.053 
(0.656) 
0.230 
(0.050) 
DISC 2 
0.365 
(0.001) 
0.414 
(0.000) 
0.453 
(0.000) 
0.235 
(0.046) 
0.301 
(0.010) 
0.102 
(0.389) 
0.217 
(0.065) 
DISC 3 
0.651 
(0.000) 
0.665 
(0.000) 
0.041 
(0.733) 
0.377 
(0.001) 
-0.095 
(0.426) 
0.136 
(0.250) 
ANALYST MARKET 
0.796 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.855) 
0.564 
(0.000) 
-0.097 
(0.417) 
0.156 
(0.186) 
0.166 
(0.160) 
0.583 
(0.000) 
-0.302 
(0.009) 
0.182 
(0.123) 
RETURN 
-0.035 
(0.768) 
-0.172 
(0.146) 
-0.020 
(0.869) 
LIST 
-0.149 
(0.209) 
0.108 
(0.362) 
LEV 
0.054 
(0.647) 
Notes: The p-values quoted above (in parentheses) are for a two-tail test of statistical significance. The natural log of market value is included in the analysis. DISC is 
the overall company disclosure score, DISC_ ! is the partial company disclosure score for background and non-financial information, DISC_2 for trend analysis and 
management discussion and analysis, DISC_3 for risk, value-based and projected information. Disclosure scores are obtained from annual reports for the fiscal year 
1997 and provided by the Swiss Banking Institute at the University of Zurich. ANALYST is the number of analysts following a specific firm as of June 1998, reported 
by I/B!E/S International. MARKET is the market value of outstanding equity at the beginning of 1998 in CHF millions. RETURN equals the average reali<:ed return 
on equity for sample firms over the last five years. LIST is a categorical variable set equal to one if the firm's shares are multiple listed and <:ero otherwise. LEV is the 
ratio of total debt to market value of outstanding equity at the beginning of 1998. AUDIT is a categorical vatiable set equal to one if the firm is audited by a "Big Six" 
audit firm and zero otherwise. All calculations are based on 73 observations. 
TARLR4 
Regression of Ex ante Cost of Capital on Beta, Leverage and Market Value 
ROE,= a + ~,BETA, + ~2LEV, + ~1ln(MARKET,) + £, 
Intercept BETA LEV MARKET Adj. R :c 
(+) (+) (-) 
Panel A: Simple Regressions (OLS) 
Coefficient 0.0647 -0.0047 0.0% 
P-value (0.000) (0.805) (0.390) 
Coefficient 0.0564 0.0089 17.7% 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Coefficient 0.089 1 -0.0041 2 1.4% 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Multiple Regressions (OLS) 
Coefficient 0.0899 0.0108 -0.0052 24 .2% 
P-va1ue (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) 
Coefficient 0.0786 0.0058 -0.0030 26.9% 
P-value (0.000) (0.007) (0.00 1) (0.000) 
Coefficient 0.0808 0.0070 0.0049 -0.0040 27.3% 
P-value (0.000) (0.118) (0.025) (0.00 1) (0.000) 
Notes: The p-values quoted above (in parentheses) are for a one-tail test of statistical s ignificance for directional 
predictions and for a two-tail test otherwise. The natural log of market value is included in the analysis. Data for 
financial leverage is winsorized at the upper and lower 5% of observations. White's ( 1980) test does not indicate the 
presence ofheteroscedasticity. Using Cook's distance, no influential data points were detected. ROE is my estimate 
of future expected cost of equity capital derived as the internal rate of return from a twelve-year version of the 
residual income model as described in the text. BETA is estimated via a market model regression requiring at least 
24 weekly return observations in the two-year period ended June 30, 1998. LEV is the ratio of total debt to market 
value of out.:;tanding equity at the beginning of 1998. MARKET is the market value of outstanding equity at the 
beginning of 1998 in CHF millions. The sample consists of 73 non-financial companies listed on the Swiss 
Exchange SWX, where the necessary forecast and disclosure data is available. 
TABLES 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Ex ante Cost of Capital 
and Firm Characteristics 
Variable ROE BETA LEV DRANK MARKET 
BETA -0.102 
(0.390) 
LEV 0.251 -0.04 1 
(0.032) (0.733) 
DRANK -0.478 0.407 0.066 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.5 80) 
MARKET -0.474 0.558 -0.302 0.542 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
ANALYST -0.372 0.701 -0.097 0.545 0.796 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.417) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: The p-values quoted above (in parentheses) are for a two-tail test of statistical s ignificance. The 
natural log of market value is included in the analysis. ROE is my estimate of future expected cost of 
equity capital derived as the internal rate of return from a twelve-year version of the residual income 
model as described in the text. BET A is estimated via a market model regression requiring at least 24 
weekly return observations in the two-year period ended June 30, 1998. LEV is the ratio of total debt to 
market value of outstanding equity at the beginning of 1998. DRJ\NK is the fractional rank (rank 
divided by number offinns) of the finn's disclosure score. MARKET is the market value of outstanding 
equ ity at the beginning of 1998 in CHF millions. ANALYST is the number of analysts following a 
specific firm as of June 1998, reported by IIB/E/S International. All calculations are based on 73 
observations. 
TARLR6 
Regression of Ex ante Cost of Capital on Beta, Leverage, 
Disclosure Score and Market Value 
ROE; = a + j3,BETA; + j32LEV; + j33DRANK; + j34 ln(MARKET;) + E; 
Intercept BETA LEV DRANK MARKET 
(+) (+) (-) (-) 
Panel A: Simple Regress ion (OLS) 
Coefficient 0.0736 -0.0244 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Multiple R egressions (OLS) 
Coefficient 0.0877 0.0133 -0.0182 -0.0038 
P-value (0.000) (0.009) (0.002) (0.00 1) 
Coefficient 0.0732 0.0073 -0.0200 -0.0009 
P-value (0.000) (0.00 1) (0.001) (0.198) 
Coefficient 0.0758 0.0088 0.0062 -0.0208 -0.0020 
P-value (0.000) (0.055) (0.004) (0.001 ) (0.060) 
Panel C: Multiple Regressions (2SLS) 
Coefficient 0.0886 0.0123 -0.0113 -0.0044 
P-value (0.000) (0.02 1) (0.302) (0.016) 
Coefficient 0.0695 0.0084 -0.0338 0.0005 
P-value (0.000) (0.00 1) (0.062) (0.578) 
Coefficient 0.0718 0.0102 0.0073 -0.0374 -0.0004 
P-value (0.000) (0.034) (0.003) (0.043) (0.437) 
Adj. R " 
2 1.8% 
(0.000) 
32.2% 
(0.000) 
36.6% 
(0.000) 
38.1% 
(0.000) 
30.9% 
(0.000) 
31.5% 
(0.000) 
30.6% 
(0.000) 
Notes: The p-va lues quoted above (in parentheses) are for a one-tail test of stat istical s ignificance for directional 
predictions and for a two-tail test otherwise. The natural log of market value is included in the analys is. Data for 
financial leverage is winsorized at the upper and lower 5% of observations. In the OLS regressions, White's (1980) 
test does not indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity. In the 2SLS regressions, reported p-values are based on 
W hite's heteroscedast icity-consistent standard errors. Using Cook's distance, no influential data po ints were detected. 
ROE is my estimate of future expected cost of equity capital derived as the internal rate of return from a twelve-year 
version of the residual income model as described in the text. BET A is estimated v ia a market model regression 
requiring at least 24 weekly return observations in the two-year period ended June 30, 1998. LEV is the ratio oftotal 
debt to market value of outstanding equity at the beg inning of 1998. DRANK is the fractional rank (rank divided by 
number of finns) of the firm's disclosure score. MARKET is the market value of outstanding equity at the beginning 
of 1998 in CHF millions. The sample consists of 73 non-financial companies listed on the Swiss Exchange SWX, 
where the necessary forecast and disclosure data is ava ilable. 
APPENDIX A 
Summary of the Major Elements of Disclosure Score DISC 
Part 1: Background and non-financial information (20 points) 
1. Principle products 
2. Principle markets and market shares 
3. Business environment and critical factors of success 
4. Corporate governance and organizational structure 
5. Client satisfaction 
6. Employee satisfaction 
7. Investments in human resources and management development 
8. Investments in research & development and other intangible assets 
9. Product life cycle and innovation 
I 0. Operational efficiency 
Part 11: Trend analysis and management discussion and analysis (20 points) 
I. Trend in sales over the last several years 
2. Sales by region and/or business segment 
3. Trend in operating income over the last several years 
4. Operating income by region and/or business segment 
5. Trend in capital expenditures over the last several years 
6. Capital expenditures by region and/or business segment 
7. Trend in stock prices and total shareholder return 
8. Discussion of changes in sales and market share 
9. Discussion of changes in operating income 
10. Discussion of changes in capital expenditures or research & development 
Part Ill: Ri~·k, value-based and projected information (1 4 points) 
I. Use and implementation of risk management 
2. Quantitative risk exposure 
3. Use and implementation of value-based management 
4. Quantitative measures for shareholder value creation 
5. Management compensation 
6. Profit forecasts 
7. Sales and growth forecasts 
Notes: The above is a list of items included in the disclosure score DISC which covers annual reports of 73 
Swiss listed companies for fiscal 1997. Further information can be obtained from the Swiss Banking Institute at 
the University of Zurich. 
APPENDIXB 
Calculation of Ex ante Cost of Capital for the Forbo Group 
(in CHF per registered share unless otherwise stated) 
Parameters: 
Earnings forecasts 
Book value 
Div idend payout ratio 
Actual price 
Swiss market return on equity 
Ex ante cost of capital 
Year 
FYI FY2 LTG 
53.70 59.5o I 6.40'% 1 
480.38 BOOK 
28'% PAYOUT 
847.95 PRICE 
8.98'% ROE SWISS 
I 6.72% I ROE 
Explicit forecast period 
1998 1999 2000 
Earnings I 53 .70 I 59.50 I 63.3 1 I 
Div idend 15. 14 16.7!\ 17.85 
Book value (beginning of year)l 480 .381 51 8.94 561.66 
Fading period (9 years) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
66.89 70.51 74.1 6 77.82 8 1.48 85.10 
18.86 19 .88 20.91 21.95 22.98 24.00 
607.11 655.14 705.76 759.01 814.88 873.38 
2007 2008 
88.68 92.18 
25 .01 25.99 
934.49 998.16 
2009 
95.58 
95.58 
1'064.34 
Perpetuity 
~
RV 
95.58 
95.58 
Effective return on equity 
Ex ante cost of capital 
Abnormal return on equity 
Residual income (Rl) 
Present value of Rl 
11.18'% 
6.72'% 
4.45'% 
21.39 
20.05 
11.47'Yo 
6.72% 
4.74% 
24.60 
2 1.60 
11.27% 1 11.o2% 1 10.76% 1 10.51 % 1 10.25% 1 10.oo% 1 9.74'% 1 9.49% 1 9.23% 1 8.98% 1 
1'064.34 
8.98'% 
Cum. present value of Rl 
Implied value 
367.57 
1 847.95 1 
6.72% 6.72% 
4.55% 4.29% 
25.54 26.06 
21.01 20.09 
6.72% 6.72% 6.72% 
4.04% 3.78% 3.53% 
26.45 26.70 26.78 
19.10 18.07 16.98 
6.72% 6.72'% 6.72% 6.72% 6.72% 6.72'% 
3.27% 3.02% 2.76% 2.51% 2.26% 2.26% 
26.68 26.37 25.83 25.05 24.oo 1 356.91 1 
15.85 14.68 13 .47 12.24 10.99 163.44 
Notes: This appendix provides an example of the ex ante cost of capital calculation I(Jr the Forno Group as of June 30, 1998. The following pammctcrs arc used: FYI and FY2 arc analysts' consensus forecasts I(Jr one-year-
ahead and two-year-ahead earnings per share us of June I 998. LTG is the mean future expected long-tcnn carn i n~'S growth mtc us of June I 998. Analyst datu is provided by 1/ l:l/E/S International. BOOK is the book value per 
share at the beginning ofthcal 1998. PA YOUTcquals the company's average dividend payout mtio over the last five years. PRICE is the equally weighted stock price I(Jrthc month of June I 998. ROE SWISS is the median 
value of past returns on equity from all Swiss listed companies over the last tivc years. ROE is my estimate of future expected cost of equity capital derived as the internal mtc of return from a twelve-year vers ion of·hc 
residual income model. A four-stage approach is adopted to compute this rate: tirst, I usc analysts' earn ings for::custs and long-tcnn growth rate us earnings proxy t(,r the next three years, second, I derive future cxpcc:cd 
earnings by linearly fading year 2000 return on equity ( 11.27~ .. ;,) to the historical Swiss market median (8.98%) by the year 2009, third, I calculate terminal value by assuming the latest residual income of24.00 CHF per 
share as a perpetuity, and fourth, I set the implied value cqmlto the avcmgc stock price forthc month of June (847.95 CHF) and solve forthc internal rate of return. The process yie lds a cost of capital-estimate of 6.72% for 
the F omo Group. 
